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Students Hear
'King of Torts'
W4£ ~uffolk Ifiaht

~rpnritr
SPRING 1960

OFFICE OF HUB MAYOR
AGAIN HELD BY ALUMNUS
"They said it couldn't be done," but last November, the people exercised their democratic right, that of voting, and elected as the Mayor of
Boston John F. Collins, 40, of Jamaica Plain ... despite predictions of the
pollsters!
Purely as an incident to this, they also put into office, for the second
consecutive time, an attorney who was educated at Suffolk Law School.
Mayor John B. Hynes, who chose And Suffolk was his alma mater not to seek the office again, after a and he brought it pride and redecade of service as Mayor of Bos- spect.
Suffolk's latest "gift" to its
ton, won his degree from Suffolk
University Law School in 1927.
mother city-in the form of the
His actual service to Boston, top city official, that is - John F.
however, began back in 1920, when Collins - took his LL.B. from the
he went to work at City Hall as a law school in 1940 - with honors!
$25-a-week clerk.
He was a mere 21 years of age
John Hynes was born 62 years when he passed the Bar. Mayor
ago in the South End, the son of Collins had been register of probate
Irish-born parents. But Boston was for Suffolk County since February
his city - and he served it well.
(Continued on page 5)

Law Alumni Will Hear Expert
On Constitutional Law June 9
The Bussey Professor of Law at Harvard, Arthur Eugene Sutherland, who is regarded as one of the nation's leading authorities on constitutional law, will be principal speaker at the annual commencement dinner of the Suffolk Law School Alumni Association June 9 at the Parker
House.
He will speak on some phase of the critique of the United States
Supreme Court, according to Paul T. Smith of Brighton, prominent Boston trial lawyer and president of the law alumni.

(Photo by duette)

"KING OF TORTS" - Melvin M. Belli, center, internationally-known trial lawyer, on lecture visit to law school. With
him are Dean Frederick A. McDermott, left, Needham, and
student Paul L. Wong of Brattleboro, Vt.

Famed Atty. Belli Presents Views
On Cutter Lab~ Chessman Cases
The Salk vaccine case of Cutter Laboratories, Inc. and the Caryl
Chessman case, were two of the provocative topics for discussion by the
noted San Francisco attorney, Mr. Melvin Belli, on his recent lecture visit
to Suffolk University Law School.
Mr. Belli, well-known as "The King of Torts," was introduced to the
student body by Mr. Joseph Schneider, past president of the Massachusetts Bar Association and currently a trustee of Suffolk University.
The audience was soon treated to
a manifestation of the art of trial
practice technique. Mr. Belli vividly discussed the Cutter Laboratory
NEW SUFFOLK LAW TEAM
case, the Caryl Chessman case, and
the developing law of breach of
FOR NAT'L MOOT COURT
warranty.
In reference to the latter topic,
COMPETITION IS NAMED
he demonstrated the legal relations
among the manufacturer of goods,
A panel of five seniors, Bruce
intermediary parties and the final
purchaser of such goods. Mr. Carpenter, Armen Der MarderoBelli stated emphatically that he is sian, James Jung, James Lalime
a disciple of the doctrine that there and Charles Olney, have underneed not be any privity of contract taken the difficult task of selecting
shown to maintain an action based representatives for next season's
on breach of warranty. His sketch- National Moot Court Competition.
ings on the blackboard of the lec- Their decision was based upon
ture room indicating the relations written briefs and oral arguments.
among parties in a warranty suit The panel considered each participrompted the lecturer to review his pant's analysis of the problem,
method of computing damages in clear and concise legal reasoning
and argument, oral delivery and repersonal injury suits.
Mr. Schneider, in his introduc- sponsiveness to questions asked
tion of Melvin Belli, spoke of the during oral presentation.
It was the panel's unanimous
compassion this attorney has for
his clients. Many who heard him opinion that all participants perat Suffolk University Law School formed outstandingly. Unfortunwere inclined to agree with Mr. ately only three could be selected.
Schneider that Melvin Belli is a After some "conflict," the panel
"20th century apostle laboring in reached a final decision. Particithe vineyard of the courtroom for pating in the Eleventh Annual Naequality and justice on behalf of tional Moot Court Competition will
the individual degraded by the be Peter Monahan, Alan Refkin
and Richard Smith.
torts of others."

Practiced in Rochester
He was associated with the
American Commission for Near
East Relief in Asia Minor and
Thrace in 1919 and in 1926 was
admitted to the New York State
Bar. He practiced in Rochester in
1926-41 and was secretary to U.S.
Supreme Court .J ustice Oliver
Wendall Holmes in 1927-28.
Prof. Sutherland was commissioner of the Uniform State Laws
of New York in 1948-50 and served
as professor of law at Cornell University in 1945-50, when he reThe Student Bar Association returned to his alma mater.
The Bussey Professor of Law at cently held its elections for the
Harvard since 1955, he served as 1960-61 year. The following were
a Fulbright lecturer at Oxford Uni- chosen as officers of the Association
versity in 1956 and was a delegate and representatives to the Board of
to the New York State Constitu- Governors:
James Trodden, President
tional Convention in 1938.
James Longolucco, Class ReA trustee of Wesleyan Univerpresentative and A. L. S. A.
sity, he served with the Army in
Representative
1941-45 and saw duty with the
John Bush, Vice-President
Office of Under Secretary of War,
John McLaughlin, Representaheadquarters, 1st infantry division;
tive of the second year (Day
headquarters, 5th Army, headDivision)
(Continued on page 7)

S. B. A. Names 1960 - 61 Leaders

Prof. Arthur Sutherland

Born at Rochester, N. Y. in 1902,
Prof. Sutherland was educated in
public and private schools in the
United States and Switzerland and
took an A.B. from Wesleyan University at Middletown, Ct. in 1922
and his LL.B. from Harvard in
1925.

Michael Breen, Chairman of
the Board;
Edward Parker, Representative of the fourth year (Evening Division)
John T. Sweeney, Treasurer
Dean Tomlinson, Representative of the third year (Evening Division)
Bernard McManus, Secretary
Frank Caprio, Representative
of the second year (Evening
Division)
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VOLUME I, NO. 1

Founded in 1960 as the official newspaper of the Suffolk University Law
School Student Bar Association. Faculty Advisor: Professor David J.
Sargent, Esq.
Address: Suffolk Law Reporter, Beacon Hill, Boston
Board of Editors: Louis M. Bell, Bruce K. Carpenter; Armen Der Marderosian; James G. Jung, Jr., James L. Lalime
Contributors: Michael Breen, Alexander Cella, Robert Cox, Ron D' Avolio,
Joseph Hachey, Herman Hemingway, Russell Mahoney,
Jordan Ring, Richard Smith, James Trodden

Suffolk Law Dean's Message
This issue of the Suffolk Law Reporter marks the first printed publication of the Student Bar Association of Suffolk University Law School,
a fitting climax to its first year of existence. Its circulation among the
Alumni as well as the student body will serve to strengthen the ties which
bind us all to Suffolk University Law School.
Initial social activities of the Association, informal receptions for
the first year day and evening students, were highly successful, and the
first Student Bar Association Dance was a
well attended and thoroughly enjoyable affair. The Association's assistance to the
undergraduate Appellate Moot Court program, through counselling and judging by the
members of the National Moot Court Competition team of the Law School and others,
was invaluable. Organization of The Prelaw
Club for students in the University was another important project. An earlier intramural mimeographed issue of the Legal Memo
informed the students of developments in the
Association.
In summary, during its first year of existence, the Student Bar Association has made
sound beginnings in the development of a program of constructive activity, which will in
the future, it is hoped, be of increasing benefit
to the School as a whole. Professor David J.
Sargent, the Faculty Adviser, was of course
available for consultation and advice. HowDean Frederick McDermott ever, the members of the Association were
left largely to rely upon their own initiative, and the student body, and
particularly the Officers and Class Representatives, are to be congratulated upon their pioneering efforts.

Jll.lU1,v,i&
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Student Bar President's Message
The academic year of 1959 and 1960 is swiftly coming to a conclusion. The memories experienced during it will always be remembered
by the graduating class and carried in their hearts for many years to
come. The accomplishment has been tremendous and the numerous "firsts" extensive.
We have witnessed the establishment of the
Student Bar Association; the acceptance into
the American Law Student Association; our
membership in the National Moot Court
Competition; the participation of the student
body in the varied social activities; and last,
the publication of the first law school newspaper. Many wonderful "seeds" have been
sown, and with your assistance and cultivation, these seeds will not fall upon rock to
wither up and die, but will continue to grow,
as they have in the past, through your ardent
co-operation.
The office of President of the SBA has been
held by me with the greatest of pleasure and
the deepest humility. The pleasure being the
materialistic honor that accompanies a position of this nature; the humility is the spirit.
ualistic feeling one acquires when men of
James L. Lahme
equal status and position have selected you
to be the individual whom they deem qualified to fulfill the obligations
of this office. This in itself will give me great confidence and incentive
for the future.
The only regret that I possess in writing this message is that it will
be the last time I will address you from this office. My one desire is that
you give the cooperation extended me to your newly elected President
in the forthcoming year. It is through your endeavor alone, as the student body of Suffolk University Law School, that will promote the
success of this organization.

!)a»uM £. clllW1Vl '60

The closing of the spring semester marks the first anniversary of
the Suffolk University Law School Student Bar Association and of the
Association's membership in the American Law Student Association.
Much credit is due 1st Circuit Vice President Steve Koplin of Boston
University Law School for his aid in the "blueprinting" of our S. B. A.,
and also for his help in setting up the machinery necessary for the Association's becoming a member of A. L. S. A.
An enjoyable time was had by
the evening freshman students
who attended a coffee and doughnut hour at the student lounge
sponsored by the S. B. A., for the
combined purpose of orientation
and informal discussion with the
membei"s of the faculty.
President Robert J. Munce was
kind enough to allow the S. B. A. to
make use of his office for the same
purpose for the daytime freshmen.
It is hoped that in the coming
school year this program will be
extended to include at least a full
day of activity.
The entertainment committee,
headed by Neil Driscoll and James
Lalime, did a magnificent job in
planning and staging the S. B. A.
dance which was held at the Brighton Municipal Hall. The success of
the dance is evidenced by the many
requests for another such event.
From the many suggestions and
advice of the different S. B. A.s in
attendance at the workshops at the
A. L. S. A.'s 11th Annual Convention held at Miami, one of the first
programs set up by the Board of
Governors was the formation of a
Pre-Legal Club. It can be stated
that this organization - made up
of Pre-Legal students - is functioning quite well as of this date.
The students who attended the
joint 1st and 2nd Circuit Convention held at Boston College Law
School received much information

concerning the functions of the
S. B. A. s there present.
Congratulations are extended in
advance to those soon to be elected
officers of the S. B. A. for the coming school year.
Although the seniors may be
crowded for time due to the coming
Bar Exam, an evening of gaity is
planned for them by way of a banquet to be held in the early part of
June.
Good Luck to the seniors who
will be taking the Exam ....

Note of
Appreciation
The students of the Law School
express their gratitude to the outgoing officers of the Bar Association. Particular thanks are afforded
to Dean McDermott, who undertook the task of supervising the
drafting of the Constitution of the
Association, and to James Lalime,
who will be remembered as the
great first President of the Student
Bar Association of Suffolk University Law School.
The students offer congratulations to the newly elected officers
and continued success to the outgoing Board of Governors.

'Wig & Robe newJ
The annual Spring banquet of
the Suffolk University Law School
Wig & Robe Society, one of the oldest law school student groups in
the nation, was held Tuesday
(May 10) at 7 p. m. in the Casino
Room of the Hotel Fensgate in
Boston. Senior Russell Mahoney of
Chelsea, president, presided.
Guests of honor for the event included Dean Frederick A. McDermott of Needham, Massachusetts
Superior Court Associate Justice
Frank J. Donahue of Hyde Park,
chairman of the trustees' committee of Suffolk Law School; Massachusetts Land Court Judge John E.
Fenton of Lawrence, vice-president
of Suffolk University, and Atty.
Paul T. Smith of Brighton, president of the Suffolk Law School
Alumni Association.
Atty. John V. Colburn, assistant
professor of English in the college
and director for its student activities, was toastmaster.
The primary purpose of the society is to foster a closer unity between students, faculty and alumni
and to encourage its fellow members in future undertakings. The
Annual Dinner-Dance has been
most successful in expressing this
fraternal spirit.

SWORN IN - Suffolk
Law School's attractive
young registrar, graduate in the Class of 1958,
now working on an LL.M.
degree evenings at Suffolk, and a member of the
Mass. Bar, and who was
recently sworn in before
the Federal Bar. She is,
of course, Catherine T.
Judge of West Roxbury.
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THE MASSACHUSETTS BAR EXAMINATION
In order to acquaint applicants for admission to the Massachusetts
Bar with essentials of bar examination procedure the following information is submitted.

Why Bar Exams Are Given
A bar examination is necessary
to find out, as accurately as practicable, whether or not the applicant
is now ready to practice law. Dean
James E. Brenner of Stanford
University Law School stated:
"The primary objectives of
a Bar Examination should be
to test the applicants' ability
to reason logically, to make an
accurate legal analysis of the
problems included in the examinations, and to demonstrate thorough knowledge of
the fundamental principles of
the law and their application.
Bar Examinations should not
be designed primarily for the
purpose of testing information, memory or experience."
The examiners try to draw questions the answers to which will
disclose, or at least cast some light
on, each applicant's ability to analyze facts ; to grasp the important
issues of law raised by those facts ;
to perceive the fields of law involved (unlike law school examinations bar examination questions
carry no labels, indeed most of
them could not because they are
not confined to a single field) ; to
recognize the points on which the
law is settled beyond argument and
those on which there is still room
for intelligent difference of opinion ; to reason intelligently; to use
common sense ; and to produce a
statement
that
well-organized
shows some ability to think and to
express one-self like a lawyer.

The Questions
There are two written examinations a year, one in early ,J uly, the
other in late December. Each is
held on two days, each day divided
into two three-hour sessions.
The rules of the board, approved
by the Court, provide that the examinations be on some or all of
these subjects: Administration of
Estates, Agency, Business Organizations, Conflict of Laws, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal
Law, Domestic Relations, Equity,
Evidence, Federal Income, Estate
and Gift Taxation, Negotiable Instruments, Massachusetts Pleading
and Practice, Real Property (including Mortgages), Sales, Torts,
Trusts, and Wills. (It may be
noted that the board has announced
that equal credit will be given to
answers based upon the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law and
the Uniform Commercial Code in
the July 1960 Bar Examination.)
There are twenty-four questions
on each examination. Following a
pre-arranged schedule by which
each of the board's five members
prepares questions, the examination will consist of four questions
drafted by the chairman and five
drafted by each of the other members.
After the members have drafted
their questions, each question is
discussed and scrutinized by the
entire board critically. Every endeavor is made to eliminate ambiguity and to phrase the questions

so that the applicant has a fair opportunity to answer the issues
raised within the average thirty
minutes of allotted time. Every
examination is a product of the
board as a whole.

Ta king the Examination
The board has made the following suggestions on the taking of
the Bar Examination :
1. Think before you write. Read
each question carefully. Understand the facts, and their necessary
implications, thoroughly and accurately. Out line in your own
mind the issues or problems ; state
to yourself your tentative conclusions; test each conclusion from the
standpoints both of the law and of
common-sense; and revise them if
necessary. Then decide on a logical, orderly, and convincing arrangement for the statement of
your views. Until you have done
all that you are not ready to write
the an.')Wer.
2. Do not restate the facts. The
examiners know what the facts
are; and you have no time to waste.
3. Do not state abstract or irrelevant propositions of law. It
is usually undesirable to begin an
answer with a legal proposition.
If the proposition in applicable it
will be more appropriate later in
the answer, in order to indicate the
reason for your conclusion. Although it is seldom necessary to
state any applicable rule of law in
full detail, make a sufficiently detailed reference to it in your
answer so that the examiner will
not be left in doubt as to your
knowledge of it and of the conditions which make its application
proper. Do not, by speculating on
what the case would have been if
the facts had been different, nor in
any other way, work into your
answer some point of law with
which you happen to be familiar,
but which is not called for by the
question. The examiners are not
interested in knowing how many
rules of law you have learned, but
in the way you apply the applicable
rules to the facts stated.
4. Discuss all the 'J)roblems that
are raised. A grasp of all the issues is essential. If there are, for
example, three issues in a given
question, a discussion of only one
of them, no matter how masterly,
if coupled with an omission to
touch on the other two, could not
result in full credit for that question.
5. Express yourself clearly, and
as a lawyer should. Write ,as legibly as possible. If you commit any
of the following faults you run the
risks of obscuring your own
thought, of failing to demonstrate
your ability, and of wasting your
limited time. Avoid: ambiguous,
meaningless, and rambling statements; verbosity, and long, involved sentences ; undue repetition;
flippancy, slang, and colloquialism.

The Marking of Answers
The members of the board correct, or are responsible for the

correction of, the answers to the
After the oral interviews a list
questions which were written by is prepared of recommended canthem respectively. Since 1931 the didates and distributed to all Bosboard has had the assistance of ton papers and some others outside
"readers", qualified lawyers ap- the city; and personal notice is
pointed by the members, with the given by mail to each applicant
approval of the Supreme Judicial that he has, or has not, been sucCourt ( Opinion of the Justices, 279 cessful. A "legal notice" is then
Mass. 607, 613.)
published stating the names and
There is no such thing as an ex- date on which the recommendation
actly correct answer to any bar is to be filed. This notice is required
examination question in the sense to be published at least 15 days bethat any other phraseology or ap- fore the board is to report to the
proach would be unacceptable, or Court. Its principal purpose is to
"wrong". Each member of the enable any member of the public
board carefully prepares and fur- to bring forward any information
nishes to his reader or readers, a he has detrimental to an appliguide for the correction of the an- cant's character or fitness. After
swers, which indicates the elements the expiration of the 15 day period,
to be looked for in the answers to unless some reason to the contrary
the questions which he drafted. has appeared, the board files in
The guide covers all the points in Court a separate report on each
each question. Usually the mem- successful petition. A separate reber has his own idea of the law on port has previously been filed on
each of those points; but (except each unsuccessful petition.
The applicant's petition for adin instances in which the law is
prescribed by a basic statute or mission, and the papers filed with
settled by familiar leading cases) it, usually make out a JYrima facie
an intelligent discussion which case in favor of his moral characleads the applicant to a different ter. If a serious complaint is made
conclusion from the examiner's against an applicant, the board inmay nevertheless receive full cred- vestigates fully, giving a hearing
to the applicant, and, if necessary,
it.
On each question the maximum to the complainant and witnesses.
credit is 10 points, but the marks If the board decides adversely to an
on the 24 questions are reduced by applicant on the issue of moral
a commutation table to a grading character or "qualifications", it
in which perfection would be files with the Court ( unless the
application is withdrawn) a spe100%.
Each applicant is given a num- cial report stating the facts on
ber, which appears on his answer which it bases its recommendation
book. No examiner or reader, that the applicant not be admitted.
Applicants who are recomwhile correcting any set of an- .
swers, knows the name of the ap- mended are usually sworn in on a
plicant; nor do the examiners group motion made by the chairthemselves know, until the mark- man to a single justice of the Suing has been completed, which ap- preme Judicial Court.
plicants have which numbers.
There is no "quota" of any kind,
Further Information
- not in respect of number or proThe general subject is covered
portion to pass, nor of place of residence, law school, sex, age, race, by the Supreme Judicial Court's
religion, or any other category. "General Rules. I. Attorneys"; by
The bar examination passing mark the "Rules of the Board of Bar
has been set at 50 %. Anyone who Examiners"; by General Laws
obtains that grade will be recom- (Ter. Ed.) c. 221, §§ 35-39; and by
mended for admission, unless Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass.
some valid objection is made on 607, Opinion of the Justices, 289
Mass. 607, Keenan, Petitioner, 310
character grounds.
In the case of every applicant Mass. 166, 171, and Matter of
whose first marking falls between Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 196.
48 % and 50 %, all his answers are
reread by the examiners or under
The information contained herein are
their supervision. This practice extracts from "Bar Examination Procedin Massachusetts" by Walter Powers,
results in the increase of a few ure
Chairman, Board of Bar Examiners, Bosmarks to the passing grade.
ton Bar Journal, September 1957.

Further Investigation
All candidates who have attained
passing grades are interviewed
orally by at least one member of
the board. The board inquires into
such matters as criminal records,
intention to practice or teach law,
residency in Massachusetts, Communist affiliations, and the ability
to speak English correctly or intelligibly. The purposes of the oral
interview also include establishing
a friendly contact with the lawyers-to-be, and the opportunity to
extend to them a sort of official
congratulation and welcome into
the profession.

SENIOR CLASS
ELECTS OFFICERS
The Class of '60 recently held
elections to select class officers.
After a great deal of debate, nominations were made. Thereupon
the voting commenced, and out of
the smoke came the four class officers:
President - Gerard Doherty
Vice-President - Armen Der
M arderosian
Treasurer - Richard J. Walsh
Secretary - Bruce K. Carpenter
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A DETERRENT TO THE COMMISSION OF MURDER
(Suffolk Uni'l'ersity Law School student Alexander J . Cella gained his seat in
the Massachusetts House in 1.CJMJ-with the biggest vote ever given to a first-time
candidate from Medford's 26th District!
The youthful Democrat, u·ho 'Was a teachi·ng fellow in the departmem,t of government at his alma mater, Harvard, when he was first elected to. the House, holds
a master's degree from the Har1.:ard Littauer School of Public Administration.)
by Alexan der Cella,
member of the General Court
No single issue of modern criminal law and penology has received more critical
attention si.nce the encl of \\'orld \i\Tar II than the controversial issue of capital punishment. \i\There once the death penalty issue had been quietly relegated to the relatively
comfortable and i1111ocuous status of a collegiate and high school debating topic, increasingly in recent years the spotlight of public interest in many sections of the
nation and the world has been uneasily focused upon the troublesome question of
whether or not capital punishment should be abolished. The reasons underlying the
groundswell of public interest in this heretofore relatively dormant issue are many and
complex. Undoubtedly, however, the major impetus to the present reconsideration of
the role of capital punishment in our moder.n society is the growing malaise produced
by the steady accumulation of evidence, statistical and otherwise, from all over the
civilized world which tends to cast considerable doubt upon the social efficacy of the
capital penalty. ln this article, l1owever, I do not propose to retrowel the familiar
ground generally covered bv abolitionists in their arguments against the continuation
of the death penalty. Instead, I propose to re-examine the dialectics of the retentio.nist
position on the critical issue of the deterrent effect of capital punishment with respect
to the commission of murder both in the light of its inherent logic and i.n the face of
available scientific evidence.
Traditionally, social punishment has been recognized to have three major purposes - retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Society has sought from time to
time to justify particular punishments in terms of one or more of these purposes,
placing a greater or lesser degree of emphasis upon one or another at various stages
in its historical development. Retribution, the rendering of punishment in accordance
with the just deserts of the ofiending individual, always bordered on outright vengeance or retaliation. Society or at1 individual had been wronged; the state was, therefore, justified in exacting a commensurate punishment - or, as this view has come to
be commonly, yet nonetheless inaccurately, expressed in terms of a biblical injunction,
"an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."
In its more positive, less vengeful expressions, retribution con.noted the social
desire to ce.nsure or disapprove a particular act by a punishment roughly proportionate
to the seriousness and severity of the offense committed. \,Vhile retribution in the
reprobative sense · still plays an important part in intellectual theorizing about the
objectives of punishment, and capital punishment in particular, retribution in the
sense of sheer vengeance and retaliation has receded into the background or been
completely eliminated. A heightened awareness of the dignity of human life, combined
with a perceptible increase in social consciousness, has made it unfashionable to argue
for punishment in terms of a blind emotional desire lo even the score. Yet, as psychologists have long reaiized, the emotio.nal urge to avenge, to punish in the worse sense
of retribution, often underlies many of the elaborate argumentative structures which
have been erected to support particular punishments. Retributive punishment is thus
rooted to some extent in human temperament - in the mysterious, hidden longings
and dimly understood emotional needs of many individuals.
In marked contrast to the general weakening of the retributive aspect of punishment, the emphasis upon the rehabilitative · objective of social punishment has steadily
increased to the point where today it constitutes the major purpose of an enlightened
penological system. Reformation of the individual offe.nder, and his subsequent release and return to a socially useful life, are recurrent themes in the writings of modern
penologists. In this respect, it should be observed that capital "punishment," so-called,
is not really punishment at all. Human extinction by the state obviously affords the
offe.nder no opportunity to mend his ways and return to a socially productive life. Accordingly, the very existence of the death penalty, and its infliction, directly abrogates
the strongest social objective of an enlightened penal system - rehabilitation of the
wrongdoer.
By the inherent logic of their situation, supporters of capital punishment - the
retentionists - have been forced to rely primarily upo1:1 the deterrence aspect of punishment in order to justify the continuation of the capital penalty. Generally unwilling
and unable lo rest their case upon an outmoded or socially unpopular desire for retribution or vengeance and clearly precluded from asserting any rehabilitative concomitants for the ci·iminal sanction which they advocate, they have had to argue, of
logical necessity, in terms of the uniquely deterrent force and effect of capital punishment. In the great debate which has been waged on the capital punishment issue, the
inherent dialectics of the retentionist position have made the deterrence issue the determinative issue far overshadowing all others in its importance and significance.

. If the death penalty as social punishment is to be justified, then clearly it must
be conclusively demo.nstrated that its existence and its use operates to prevent individuals in our society from the commission of mm·ders that otherwise would be committed.
In other words, it must be conclusively demonstrated that capital punishment as a
deterrent is absolutely necessary for the protection of individuals in society a.nd that
no other penalty exists as an effective alternative which will grant the members of
society the same degree of social protection against potential murderers. For certainly
where we are dealing with a criminal penalty whose very imposition is final, ultimate,
and irreversible, and where inevitably the social deprivation of human life is involved,
no lesser standard of justification can be permitted to suffice. Consequently, the burden
of argumentative proof rests squarely upon the shoulders of the retentionists to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that society's continued reliance upon the use of the
death penalty is a sine qua non of social protection and preservation.
In attempting to maintain this burden of proof which the dialectics of their position have inexorably thrust upon them, the retentionists have consciously avoided or
minimized the importance of statistical evidence and have largely relied upon a common se,nse, a prior unclerstan<ling of human psychology or upon unsystematic examples
of personal experiences, primarily of law e.nforcement officials, where the consciousness of the death penalty has allegedly served to deter the commission of a murde1·.
Perhaps the classic formulation of many of the assumptions upon which the retentionist view of human nature depencls were forcefully stated close to one hundred years
by Sir James Fitzjames Stephens when he wrote:
"No other punishment deters men so effectually from comm1tt111g crimes
as the punishment of death. This is one of those propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more obvious than any
proof can make them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing against
it, but that is all. The whole experience of mankind is i.n the other direction.
The threat of instant death is the one to which resort has always been made

when there was an absolute necessity for producing some result. . . . No one
goes to certain inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the matter the
other way. \i\Tas there ever yet a criminal who, when sentenced to death and
brought out to die, would refuse the offer of a commu talion of his sentence for
the severest secondary punishment? Surely not. \,Vhy is this' It can only be
because 'All that a man has will he give for his life.' In any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope; hut death is death; its terrors cannot
be described more forcibly."
In general, the retentionists postulate the instinct for self-preservation or, conversely, the individual's fear of the loss of his life, as the single most important factor
in the determination of human behavior. In a sense, man in retentionist theory is a
complete and unabashed utilitarian continually engaged in a hedonistic calculus of the
pleasure to be gained and the pain to be avoided by his every act. Since man will cling
to life itself at all costs, cherishing it above all pains and pleasures, the existence of capital punishment, so the retentionists argue, clearly must be a deterrent to the commission
of murder.
The utilitarian foundation which underlies the retentionist theory of human nature is obviously not without some merit. Yet, as modern psychology and sociology
have recognized, it is curiously inadequate and unsatisfactory as an explanation of the
way in which man in fact does think and act. lt exalts reason over emotion, the cog.nitive factors over the impulsive factors in human behavior. It elevates the natural human
desire for self-preservation to a position of supreme, transcendant importance and, in
so doing, is directly opposed to a sig,nificant range of commonly observable human ex·perience in which an individual readily sacrifices his life for an ideal or principle, or
for the love of another person or group of persons. Just as the consistent utilitarian
is l{ard pressed to explain the phenomenon of the Christian martyr willingly embracing violent, painful death for the preservation of the ideals of his faith, so too, the
thorough-going retentionist, operating on the same basic premises, has difficulty in
explaining why, if life is dear above all else, a soldier suddenly throws himself upon a
hand grenade to shield his comrades from the explosion by sacrificing his own life.
Obviously, while the normal individual will struggle desperately to preserve his life,
there are times and circumstances in human affairs when life itself will be willingly
given up if necessary. Not only is utilitarian-retentionist thinking unable to cope adequately with this wide range of human phenomena, but it is even more particularly at
a loss to explain and justify the even wider range of criminal violations of law, including murder, which are the direct result of noncognitive, emotional, habitual or impulsive action with no consi.-!eration whatsoever of the punitive consequences involved if
the transgressor is apprehended.
Murder statistics from all over the world have pointed up the fact that a high
perce.ntage of murders are committed by individuals handicapped by poverty, ignorance,
and prejudice, by persons mentally deranged or deficient, or by persons overcome by
the heat of passion or by temporary, uncontrollable emotion. In all of these cases, it is
ridiculous to assert that the existence of the death penalty, or, for that matter, any other
particular punishment, was a rational factor in the deliberative process which preceded
the ultimate decision of any of these individuals to commit a murder. As a matter of
fact, a more realistic view of human nature in the light of experience would seem to
indicate quite clearly that the actions of most people are not primarily, or even largely,
motivated hy the pain-pleasure rational calculus of the results attendant upon such
action, but by other non-deliberative, non-ratio,nal factors.
Apart from arguments based upon utilitarian assumptions about the nature of human psychology, the retentionists have buttressed their position considerably by examples of personal experiences and individual case histories. Such subjective experiences are usually, though not exclusively, the province of law-enforcement officials in
the performance of their police duties. In general, they involve particular situations
where a potential murdered, reminded of the fact that he would suffer the death penalty for his crime, ceased and desisted from the commission of a homicide which he
would otherwise have committed. While the sincerity of those who relate these incidents cannot be challenged, their honest conclusions that their experience attests to
the efficacy of capital punishment as a deterrent to murder is undoubtedly open to
question. Could not the same result have been achieved had the potential murdered
been reminded that he would face the grim prospects of life imprisonment, or some
other harsh pu.nishmeot, were he to go ahead ·with his proposed killing? Was it really
the severity and the finality of the possible punishment or the certainty and swiftness
of apprehension and conviction which really caused the change of mind? Certainly
these conclusions are entitled to as much weight in evaluating the significance of the
testimony of law enforcement officials as the conclusions which they have honestly
chosen to draw.
The deterrent argument which law enforcement officials raise on the basis of their
subjective experiences would necessarily mean that the life of a police officer is better
protected in the carrying out of his necessary duties by the existence of the death
penalty. Yet, here too, available statistical data of the relative safety of police officials
in abolitionist and retentionist communities clearly rejects the validity of this assertion.
In his conclusions based upon a carefully documented study of the comparative safety
of the State Police in states that have and states that do not have the death penalty,
Father Donald Campion, S. J ., declared that his data "do .not lend empirical support
to the claim that the existence of the death penalty in the statutes of a state provides
a greater protection to the police than exists in states where that penalty has been
abolished." Father Campion's conclusion is further supported by the empirical studies
which have been made by Professor Thorsten Sellin and others.

Conclusion
Vv e have seen that the retentio.nists are forced, by the dialectics of their position,

to rely primarily upon the assertion of the uniquely deterrent effect of capital punishment in order to justify their views. Because of the final, ultimate, and irrevocable
character of the penalty which they advocate, as well as the inherent clanger of an erroneous conviction resulting i.n an irremediable miscarriage of justice, the retentionists
have the burden of proof of establishing beyond a shadow of doubt that the death
penalty, and the death penalty alone, is absolutely indispensable to the protection of
the members of society. Such a burden of proof, to be objectively maintained, logically
and necessarily require that statistical and other empirical· evidence be presented to
establish conclusively that, all other factors being equal, the incidence of murder in
an abolitionist community is greater than in a retentionist community.
To be sure, statistical evidence alone and by itself is not sufficient to sustain an
argument in favor of the abolition of capital punishment. · ~or while we know that
eve1·y murder in a retentionist community is striking confirmation of the inability of
. the death penalty to deter in that particular case, we cannot know for certain how
many more murders might have been committed were it not for the fact that some
potential killers were deterred by the existence of th~. death penalty .. But where the
burden of argumentative proof rests so heavily upon the~ retentionists; their lack of
statistical evidence and empirical data constitutes a fatal weakness -i.n · the · retentionist
case which cannot be adequately overcome by a priori theorizing about the nature
of human psychology or by isolated, unscientific examples of improperly or insufficient-
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Collins Second Consecutive Suffolk Mayor for the Hub
Mayors

(Continued from page 1)

of 1957 at the time the people let
it be known that they wanted him
to be their top city official last November.
He previously served in the
House from 1947 to 1950; Senate
1951-54; and in the City Council in
1956-57. A captain with Army Intelligence in World War II, he became a victim of bulbar polio in
1955 and has been confined to a
wheelchair since.
Prof. John F. X. O'Brien of the
law school recalls John Collins as
an extremely active person as a
student - and indeed he still is!

CARPENTER TOPS
ESTA TE PLANNERS

(Photo courtesy of The Boston Globe)

TALKING IT OVER-Former Mayor of Boston John B. Hynes, who stepped down from
the post after a decade of service, discusses the intricacies of running big city government
with John F. Collins, Boston's new mayor and Suffolk Law School's latest "contribution"
to its mother city.

Capital Punishment

(Continued from p,2.ge 4)

ly analyzed personal experiences. On the crucial question of the statistics of deterrence, it surely is not without major significance that the British Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, which from 1949 to 1q53 made the most comprehensive and
searchi.ng inquiry into this subject which has ever been made, reached the conclusion
Lhal Lhe incidence of murder was not dependent upon the presence or the absence of
capital punishment, but seemed to he affected by other factors completely unrelated to
capital punishment.
While the deterrence argument which occupies such a crucial point in the whole
relentionist position cannot be scientifically substantiated, either by reliance on statistics or other carefully analyzed empirical data, it is not to be expected that many
determined retentionists can be dissuaded from the continuing advocacy of the retentionist cause. For the deterrence argument has become a social myth, consciously used
to mask or conceal other less popular arguments about the objectives of social punishment or unconsciously serving to satisfy basic, unmet ~motional needs in particular
individuals or groups of individuals. As a social myth, it has transcended reason, logic,
and science itself and acquired an indepe.ndent validity all its own. Its continued existence no longer depends, therefore, upon any claim it might make to truth or objective
reality. It persists and will continue to persist, regardless of its demonstrable falsity,
because in an elaborate argumentative superstructive firmly rooted in utilitarianism, it
is supremely useful, le.nding a significant measure of social acceptability to what would
otherwise in this day and age be socially unacceptable - the unqualified expression of
the desire for vengeance and the urge to punish.

A Suggested Placement Service
After overcoming such obstacles as graduation and a bar examination, the goal of the vast majority of present-day law students is to find
employment in the legal profession. It is with this goal in mind, and the
intention of making its achievement less difficult, that the S. B. A. has
undertaken to establish a legal placement service in conjunction with
the already existing placement service of Suffolk University.
Present operating procedures of the undergraduate placement service require the registration of any student seeking employment by his
filing with the employment bureau the following information: 1) a photo,
2) an employment form and progress sheet, 3) a personal data sheet,
4) recommendations from two professors, 5) academic transcript of
grades.
Such information will serve as a reference file for preliminary
screening purposes, as well as source material for recommendations. It
is further hoped that the applicant will receive individual job counselling,
in order to obtain a job suitable to his abilities and interests.
Another service of the intended placement bureau .will be to obtain
any and all job information which might be helpful to the forthcoming
graduates of the law school. By making such information easily accessible to the student, many opportunities, heretofore unknown, would be
brought to the attention of the employment seeking law sfo·dent~ An
example of this function is the recent letter received by the S: B. A.
from the American Law Student Association. The letter stated that any
law student so desiring might receive the publication of this association
entitled. 1960 Fecleral Goi,ernment Job Opportuni'.ties For Young Attorneys, by sending twenty-five cents to A. L. S. A., American Bar
Center, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois. At present, it is
necessary for each individual student to send for such information on
his own, but it is hoped that in the not too distant future this function
will be assumed by the Placement Bureau of the S. B. A.

The winners of the 1960 Estate
Planning and Drafting Contest,
sponsored by The Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Company, were announced recently at a dinner given
the participants at the Harvard
Club.
For Suffolk, first prize went to
Bruce K. Carpenter; second to
Charles E. Olney; third to James G.
Jung, Jr.

Suffolk Law School Enters
National Moot Court Competition
This year Suffolk Law School took another step forward in its drive
to provide the best legal education possible.
For the first time an appellate moot court program was inaugurated
at Suffolk. The program is in and of itself voluntary, but it is manditory
for any law student who desires a well-rounded legal education. Those
students who partake of the course soon learn that hard work, a desire
to learn, and a keen sense of competition are prime requisities for participation.
The manner in which the pro- actly what the program consists of
gram came into being may not and what students may gain from
have been orthodox, but it was ef- it.
fective. Last year Suffolk offered
The main purpose of the proa course in appellate brief writing, gram is to acquaint students with
and as will happen, two members the procedures involved in bringing
of this class became deeply em- cases before a court of last appeal.
broiled in an argument on a point
At the very outset the particiof law. The students took the pro- pants must acquaint themselves
blem to Dean McDermott and asked with an appellate brief, its form,
him to resolve it for them. The its content and its purpose. Once
Dean in conjunction with Profes- this initial step has been taken, the
sor Sargent decided that the stu- real work begins. The case at hand
dents should resolve the question must be analyzed to the "N"th dethemselves, through submission of grees, and general issues formed.
appellate briefs. The students
Now comes the long drawn-out
worked diligently and soon had process of research through the
prepared excellent briefs on the Encyclopedias, the digests, the
problem. Arguments on the briefs codes and many diverse legal and
were held before a panel chosen lay periodicals. Once this is done
from the law school faculty. The new issues must be formed and regallery was packed with inquisitive search done on these. This process
students, only half realizing what is continued until the basic issues
was going on. By the time this have been found and research done
question was decided there were upon them.
many students feigning problems
All
the
information
thus
of law, so that they too could sub- gathered must be put into written
mit appellate briefs before our dis- form, that of an appellate brief.
The brief must be extensive enough
t,inguishnd Moot Court.
Although we didn't realize it at to cover the case fully, and yet be
the time, this seemingly accidental concise as its name would imply.
furor concerning appellate · moot
The task is not complete with
court competition was not in real- the writing of the brief. There reity accidental, but rather part of a mains an oral argument to be prewell-laid plan devised by Dean Mc- pared. The oral argument must not
Dermott and the law school faculty. be a memorized regurgatation of
The administration knew that such the brief, but rather must evolve
a program, no matter how benefi- from a complete knowledge of the
cial, would be valueless unless the case and the law involved. The
students themselves were deeply in- speaker must in his own words exterested in it. Upon this premise plain his position to the court. He
must be ready to defend this posithe plans were made.
In order to understand fully why tion against questions hurled at
the administration would go to him by a panel deeply interested in
such lengths to organize this pro- the case and which wishes to do
gram, it is necessary to know ex- justice.
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THE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE
(Senior Jordan Ring, author of this article, is top student in the law scho<>l and
plams to do graduate law work at Harvard next year, under scholarship!)
by Jordan L. Ring, '60

Power and the constitutional right to exercise a particular power are two distinct
considerations in the philosophical concept of governmental scope and function. One
endeavoring to categorize contempory co.ngressional investigatory practices in one of
the two categories can find persuasive arguments in mass for his favored position
thereon. But it shall not be the purpose of this particular analysis to pursue the justification of either abstraction. Rather, the ultimate consideration, herein, focuses narrowly upon the jurisdiction aspect that confronts one who must deal defensively with
an investigating committee's asserted authority on the plane of jurisdiction over the
person, and the matters closely related thereto.
Basic generalities of constitutional law have no little importance in this regard.
Fundamentally, our national government, in dealing with the internal aspects of their
particular functions, is one of delegated powers, which power is either specifically enumerated within the four corners of the Constitution or found to be a necessary and
proper power implied therein. Therefore, every function of our Congress is directly
dependant for its constitutional legality upon the adherance to the aforesaid principle.
It is axiomatic that a federal investigating committee has no greater authority over a
person or persons than the sum total of its creators' authority . . . Congress. If,
therefore, Congress has exceeded its authority in the establishment of a given committee, then we have an ultra-vires body ... a nullity. In a related sense, the jurisdiction
of a particular committee to compel the appearance of a.n individual before it is directly
dependant upon congressional authorization in the main, which congressional authorization is directly dependant by way of justification upon the Constitution. Hence,
initially at least, the basic and logical challenge of a committee's jurisdiction over a
person can be leveled at its very right to constitutionally exist, although it may be
submitted at the very outset that this fundamental challenge is broader in theory than
in practical application in the light of contempory legislative and judicial liberalism in
this particular field of thought.
The general power of Congress to create and vest a committee with capacity to
compel obedie.nce to its jurisdiction is a firmly established concept. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed 580; 47 Sup Ct. 319; 50 ALR 1. It is vitally important,
however, to consider carefully the general authority of Congress in order to analyse
whether in any particular instance a given committee is beyond the borders of
constitutional concer.n. [Thus, the question to be carefully considered is where
does this general authority come from and what are the reasons for its basic justification.]
McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, precisely points out that nowhere in the framework
of the Constitution is there specifically enumerated authority giving to Congress the
power to create legislative investigating committees. Nevertheless, from the standpoint
both of English and Colonial history and from the view of practicality, the Court held
such authority to be a necessary and implied power of congressio,nal function. Specifically, in order that any type of intelligent legislation may result from the sessions
of Congress, there is an obvious need for specific information relating to any particular matter under consideration by either House. Obviously, it would be sheer fallacy
to assume Congress, broad as it may be i.n membership, could possibly have within
itself at all times such a fund of information as would permit it to judge the particular
merits of every act, nor to understand the need for certain legislation in matters over
which it must protect and regulate. Hence, the need for factual information from without. [ Congress, in order to effectuate fruitful results, delegates to a relatively small
group of its membership the authority it possesses as a whole to investigate. And from
this reaso.n found by the Court to necessitate the existence of such implied authority,
we find therein the crux of the limitation of its power to investigate and therefrom
the right to compel obedience to its jurisdiction.]
Because of the breadth of the Congressional powers ... [the power to legislate,
to judge the qualifications of its members, the obligation to maintain within the States
a Republican form of government, to provide for the common defense, to perpetuate
its very existe.nce, etc . . . it may seem that it would be practically impossible for
Congress to select a field for investigation which would not be related to some proper
area of congressional concern. Actually, however, there has been ·one occasion when
the Supreme Court failed to find such relevance. That was in the 1880 case of Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168; 26 L. ed 377, testing the legitimacy of a House investigation into the bankrupt firm of Jay Cooke & Co. and its interest in a District of Columbia real estate pool. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not a subject on which
Congress could legislate and therefore had no authority to investigate. This case represents the only restrictive decision upon the power to investigate. Mr. Justice Miller
said, "We are sure that no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before
either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has
jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these bodies possesses
the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." The matter under investigation did not come within the range of congressio.nal legislation.
While the facts of this particular case are of a minimum of importance, since a similar
inquiry today under the Supreme Court's broad concept of the congressional function
would certainly be authorized, the pri.nciple expounded from that case, nevertheless,
clearly sets forth the proposition that Congress has no authority to investigate per se.
It cannot launch an investigation from the stand-point of constitutional power merely
to expose for the sake of exposure or to delve into the private affairs of citizens merely
to bring to light undesired, although legal, courses of conduct and pursuanses over
which it has no power to legislate or is prohibited by the Constitution to abridge. For
an analysis of the Kilbourn Case and the implications thereof see Congressional Investigation, .37 Cal. L Rev. 556(1949); 40 Hvd L. R. 153(1926). In order therefore for
a congressional investigating committee to have authority over a person the "PURPOSE" of the investigating committee is of a prime concern; for the purpose of the
committee must have some connection with prospective legislation or congressional
function or else have no jurisdiction over the person. But how close must the purpose
be connected with prospective legislatio.n? As will be hereinafter indicated, very little
actual connection seems necessary.
All recent cases dealing with this subject matter have had some relation to security investigations, and while it can never be doubted that these security cases have to a
large degree been pressured by the emotional complection of the nation, nevertheless,
they do outli.ne the basis of judicial philosophy regarding the general topic under consideration. So far as the issue of the Un-American Investigating Committee is concerned, obviously no matter is oi a greater importance to Congress than the internal
security of the nation and the protection of its independence a.nd integrity against conspiratorial 01· subversive attacks. For these clearly proper Congressional concerns it
is scarcely necessary to cite such expressly stated legislative functions as to "provide
for the common defense", "to raise and support armies" and the like. But this security
committee seems to have dissipated somewhat the strong Constitutional support by
being so largely uninterested in making legislative recommendations to Congress. The
mere fact that the House had stated in setting up the committee that it was for a
"Legislative Purpose" was generally regarded as binding on the Court. Mr. Justice
Clark dissenting in the case of U.S. v. Josephson, 165 F2nd 82, 333 U.S. 858, said
that upholding the committee's power over the person on this basis made the Congressional investigative power limitless for "the dram of good must always sanctify the
dubious remainder." As a simply stated proposition, the language of the majority
seems to lay down the rule that if Congress claims a particular investigation to be for
a legislative purpose the court will not say that that is not so.

(Photo courtesy of The Boston Globe)

WIG & ROBE BANQUET - principals at the annual Spring
event of the organization were, left to right, senior Russell
Mahoney of Chelsea, president; Dean Frederick A. McDermott; Atty. Paul T. Smith, president of the Suffolk Law
School Alumni Assn., and Mass. Superior Court As.sociate
Justice Frank J. Donahue, chairman of the trustees' committee for Suffolk Law School.
There seems little reason to doubt that Clark's conclusion is actually the correct
one to draw from these appellate court decisions, for all the grounds on which limits
might have been based were rejected in the Josephson Case. Justices Douglas and
Black took essentially the same position in their concurring opinion in U. S. v. Rumely,
73 S. C. at 547. "Inquiry into the personal and private affairs is precluded a.nd so is
any matter in respect to which no valid legislation could be had. Since Congress could
not by law require of respondent what the House demanded, it may not take the first
step in an inquiry ending i.n fine and imprisonment." In Barsky v. U. S., 167 F2nd 241 ,
it was said by the Court that the fact constitutional legislation "might" ensue from the
information derived by an inquiry upon the subject described in the House resolution
is sufficient to sustain the committee's jurisdiction. "The potentiality is the measure
of the power of i.nquiry" and this be so even though the legislation that might ensue
from such an investigation has a strong possibility of being found unconstitutional, and
the mere fact that very little legislation has resulted from a given inquiry is immaterial
in considering the committee's constitutional justification. But what if we discharge
syllogisms and advance judgments and concentrate rather on the charge that the committee had actually and deliberately sought to get, by publicity and exposure, results
which could not constitutionally be secured by legislation. Judge Edgerton in the
Barsky Case, supra, said that the committee had intentionally inflicted punishment on
certain witnesses by bringing about their dismissal from employment and subjecting
them to notorious publicity and held that this met the bill of attainder test in U.S. v.
Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. The majority felt otherwise and completely disregarded substance, looking merely lo form. Justice Clark dis sen ting in the Josephson Case, supra,
concluded that the committee was merely investigating for exposure's sake, and this
had been proved by the committee's questioning of the witnesses appearing before that
body. But the majority of the Court rejected the Clark position by again looking
solely to the purpose for which the committee was established and not into
the objective mannerisms. Clark vvent beyond this point and contended the committee's persistent questioning of witnesses as to whether they were members
of the Communist Party vi0lated a right to privacy and to freedom from inquiry about
political beliefs established by the first amendment and upon which Co.ngress had no
right to exact prohibitive legislation, let alone inquire. But both in the Josephson an<l
Barsky Cases the Court disposed of these points by reminding that Congress can
curtail freedom if justified by the clear and present danger test and that Congress ,need
not wait until there is a clear and present danger before it can inquire into these matters.
All that is required is a possibility of a clear and present danger and that the court
cannot assume in advance that Congress will pass unconstitutional legislation. From
what has been set forth above it may well be that legislative investigating committees
will have an area of sanctioned inquiry as broad as Congress deems necessary by
merely asserting within the enabling act of the committee that- the purpose of the said
committee is to inquire for proposed legislation and have some broad basis upon which
to rest thereon. For it now appears that the Court will not look beyond this point.
Thus the original concept of legislative investigation under our system of government
appears to have become an obsolete limitation or at least a limitation in form only.
Now, assuming in any given instance the constitutionality of a committee, what
is the immediate power over the person to compel compliance with its request to appear? For a contempt of Congress there is no doubt that either House has the inherent
power to punish through its own processes outside of the courts. :Marshall v. Gorda
243 U. S. 521; Anderson v. Dunn 6 U. S. 204. In Mc Grain v. Daugherty, supra, it was
clearly stated that either House, through its own process has power to compel a private
individual to appear before it or one of its committees and give testimony needed to
enable it effectively to exercise the legislative fu.nction belonging to it under the Constitution. However, the power of Congress to punish for contempt of its own process
is limited to imprisonment and the duration to the time of the adjournment of Congress.
See 50 ALR 21. Not only may Congress itself punish for the failure to answer a proper
question when appearing but in Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, the Supreme
Court upheld the right of Congress of punish for a past and completed action. In
this case the defendant had destroyed records which the committee requested to be
brought before it. Thus the fact that the obstruction to the legislation function is
removed or is impossible to be removed is completely immaterial in considering the
authority to punish. Such a power to punish for past and completed obstructio.ns was
exerted by Congress as early as 1795 and is a well settled principle of legislative power.
Today, by statute, (2 U.S. C. sec. 192; F. C. A. 192) Congress has supplemented the
inherent power to punish for contempt. It is to be noted that this statute does not
exclude Congress from still rendering punishment through its own process. The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in In Re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661. Section 192
makes it a misdemeanor for one properly summoned before a committee of either
House as a witness to refuse to appear or to appear and refuse to answer or produce
material papers or records. It now seems entirely possible, based upon the language
in In Re Chapman, supra, that a party in contempt could be punished both under the
statutory procedure and in addition by either House. Of course, a summary refusal
of one duly called by a committee to appear before a committee could legally result
in the physical removal of a witness to the situs of that committee. Therefore, any
attack on a committee's jurisdiction, as a practical matter of concer,n, should be made
at an appearance before the committee. The question of remedies is somewhat dubious
and leaves in doubt the question of injunctive relief in a Federal Court. However, one
wrongfully taken into custody has a right of recourse against the officer but not against
the membership of the committee, due, of course, to a congressional members immunity
under Article 1, sec. 6, cl. 1.

(Continued on page 7)
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HARVARD LAW PROFESSOR TO ADDRESS ALUMNI
Sutherland

MOOT COURT IN ACTION - at the "Trial of Jacob Druker," senior Bruce Carpenter, attorney for the defense, argues his case. At Carpeneer's immediate left, seated, is Elaine
Cocotas, a student at Bryant & Stration Commercial School, who was stenographer for
trial. Presiding is Hon. Walter F. Levis. Immediately in front of His Honor is Albert
Fadoul, serving as clerk of the court.

The Congressional Committee

(Continued from page 1)

quarters, U. S. Forces in Austria
in the Mediterranean and European Theater of Operations. Discharged as a colonel in 1945, he
now serves with that rank in the
Officers Reserve Corps.
Served with Army
For his war service he was awarded the Legion of Merit with
Cluster and Bronze Star Medal
from the U.S.; Order of the British Empire; Cross of War (twice
by France) ; Czechoslavakian War
Cross; Oussiam Alaoulte from
Morocco, and the Voluntari della
Liberta from Italy.
Prof. Sutherland is a Fellow of
the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences and a member of the
American Law Institute and
American and New York State Bar
Associations.
Author
He is author of "Cases and
Materials on Commercial Transactions" (with others), 1951, and
"Constitutional Law - Cases and
Other Problems," 1952. He is also
editor of "The Law and One
Among Many," 1956, and has been
a contributor of articles to numerous legal publications.
Prof. Sutherland, who resides in
Cambridge, is the father of two
daughters and the same number of
sons.
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On the issue of what a witness before a committee must answer and what he need
not reply to, both section 192, the fifth amendment and the committee's authority are
the direct essentials to be considered. The most basic defense here is the fifth amendm ent . . . the right to refrain from answering a questio.n amounting to compulsory
self-incrimination. As to this particular civil right of the individual, the Court has
been lib eral in the application of it and conservative to narrow its boarders of protection. This amendment is one of such vast scope that it could not be adequately dealt
with in this paper i.n total. Rut of interesting note here is the recent Supreme Court
decision of Blau v. U.S., 340 U. S. 159, which stated in substance that one may refuse
to testify if his testimony will "furnish a link in the chain of evidence against himself"
and the answer need not be of such a nature as to amou.nt to a crime itself. However,
in order to i.nvoke the privilege, the issue of statutory immunity must be considered.
In the past Congress has from time to time provided for immunity or protective clauses
thereby rendering testimony given before a committee as inadmissible in subsequent
trials of a witness by either the federal or state courts. Such a blanket of protection
extended to a witness is binding upon the states as well as the federal government.
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179. In Ullmann v. U.S., 350 U.S. 422, the Supreme
Court held in dealing with an immunity clause passed by Congress, that once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege itself ceases. Thus the Court has laid down
the proposition that one may not rightfully refuse to answer a material question without the clanger of punishment if Congress has rendered testimony coming within the
definition of the statute inadmissible in evidence against the witness at a subsequent
trial by federal or state authorities. For the individual is .not than bearing witness
against himself. However, it is now incurnbant for the witness to determine whether
or not he is within the statutes protection, for it is only when you come within the
language of the statute that the immunity prevails.
Also a prime importance is the principle that one before a committee need not
answer any and all questions directed to him by the committee. It is well established
by both judicial decision and expressly set out in section 192 that a witness need answer
only those questions pertinent to the question under inquiry by the committee. In
order to judge whether a particular question directed by the committee to the witnes'S
is pertinent to the question under inquiry, the witness has a constitutional right to
know the pu rpose under investigation. Either House in creating a particular committee
must set forth with reasonable certainty the purposes that the committee is to inquire
into. Hence, the uncertainty of the committee's scope may well be a ground of attack
on the basis of unconstitutio.nality. The witness may also inquire as of right, from
time to time, while before the committee of the relation that a particular question has
to the purpose under inquiry by that committee. U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. In
the Rumely case the Supreme Court asserted that a committee may not ask a question
outside the scope of the resolution creating that committee. There the committee
created to investigate lobbying activities asked of the witness a question regarding the
publication of books. The Court found no releva.ncy; thus the question was held to be
improper and the conviction for failure to answer was overturned. And in 136 F.2nd
791, the court said in substance that if the committee has no authority to ask the
question because it is outside the scope of the committee's purpose, even if Congress
subsequently tries to cure the defect by amendment, one who refused to answer a
question befo re Congress amended the purpose of the committee would be guilty of
nothing. If the scope is enlarged, the question must be asked again at another committee session. The crux ... has the committee authority when the question is asked. In
addition to the aforesaid, section 192 provides that the fact an answer to a committee
questio.n would tend to disgrace a witness or render him infamous is not a proper
ground for the refusal to answer.
The preceding pages g·ive some slight indication as to both the wide breath of
Congressional power and the heavy burden placed upon counsel for a witness before a
committee. Counsel involved with an appearance before one of the many committees
of our national government must give careful and concise attention to the variety of
matters discussed. Not onlv should he consider whether a committee has the constitutional right to exist but he must of necessity become extremely well versed in the
scope and purpose of a committee, as well as any immunity clause that may be relevan1
or become relevant during an appearance before the committee. For if an individual's
rights are to be protected against this vast authority of Congress .no amount of consideration can be deemed too great. And while the philosophers of governmental
authority may find valid criticism for this new form of national power, nevertheless, it
does exist and must be dealt with in its existing form.

SchofarJhipJ
A number of scholarships are available to Suffolk Law School students, both entering and upperclassmen. Certain of the Trustees'
Scholarships, covering full tuition charges, are awarded to students upon
their initial entrance to the Law School. These are limited to students
who have graduated from specified schools -and have obtained the nomination of the Presidents of the respective institutions. Each recipient
holds the scholarship for one year, and its continuance is based upon the
student's maintaining a satisfactory average in the Law School.
Present Trustees' Scholarships awarded on an annual basis are: the
David I. Walsh Scholarship to a graduate of the College of the Holy
Cross; the Louis D. Brandeis Sr,holarship to a graduate of Brandeis University; the Charles Doe Scholarship to a graduate of Dartmouth College; the Merrimack College Scholarship to a graduate of Merrimack
College.
Another of the Trustees' Scholarships is the William F. A. Graham
SchoZarship, which is awarded annually by the Faculty to a student who
typifies the high ideals exemplified by the life of the late William F. A.
Graham, Esq., of the class of 1924, long a Trustee of Suffolk University.
This is awarded to a student already in school.
In addition, the Trustees have established the Suffolk University
Scho'larships which consist of four full scholarships awarded ann11ally
to graduates of Suffolk University who have maintained high scholastic
standing in their college work.
The third group of scholarships is that entitled Alumni Fund
Scholarships, which are awarded principally to upperclassmen of the
Law School by the Faculty Scholarship Committee on the basis of
achievement, character and need. A limited number of these scholarships
are also available to outstanding applicants for admission to the Law
School. As the name implies, these awards owe their existence to the
interest and generosity of Suffolk Law School alumni and other friends
of the Law School.
Included in the · Alumni Fund Scholarships are the Class Leader
awards which are given primarily on the basis of the student's academic
achievement, although, where necessity demands, other factors are also
considered by the Scholarship Committee. These awards are presently
held by: Richard E. Smith of the second year day class; Frederick A.
Bazley of the second year evening class ; Armen Der Marderosian of the
third year day class; David J. Lessels of the third year evening class;
Albert M. Newell of the evening class which commenced in January,
1959.
In addition to the preceding five full scholarships, there were 37
other Alumni Fund Scholarships of varying amounts awarded to students
on the basis of merit and need.
There are two other scholarships which merit attention, and they
are the Steinberg Scholarship and the Fairchild Scholarship. The Steinberg Scholarship was established by Louis H. Steinberg, a graduate of
the Class of 1925, and consists of the income of certain stock. It is
awarded annually to the senior in the evening division who has the highest average for the three preceding years. The present holder of the
Steinberg Scholarship is Francis X. McDonough. The Fairchild Scholarship was established in 1926 by Mrs. Julia D. Fairchild in memory of
· her late husband. The income is awarded at the end of the freshmen year
to a student on the basis of scholarship, character and need.
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'George' - and the· S. B. A.

(Photo courtesy of The Boston Globe)

LAW DAY - Albert West, left, executive director of the
Massachusetts Bar Association, addressed students on "The
Significance of Law Day-U. S. A." at Suffolk's recent observance of the event. With him are senior Russell Mahoney of
Chelsea, center, president of the Wig & Robe Society of Suffolk Law School, and Dean Frederick A. McDermott.
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As you read this publication, you, a Suffolk Law student, may be
seized with a spontaneous urge to contribute your talents to activities
sponsored by the Student Bar Association. More realistically, however,
the legal scholar's acquired reticence to make commitments has a tendency to extinguish the spark. This article has the object of attacking
this hesitancy and its natural by-product, apathy.
By now you have been made somewhat aware of SBA, its purposes,
functions, and organization. Stripping all the finery from an elaboration
upon its aims, the essence of SBA's success is participation by the membership - namely, the student body. Whether we have an organization
in name only or a spirited, active and progressive vehicle depends upon
YOU. "George" of "Let George do it" fame is an overworked performer.
More tragically still, he often is no more capable than those who have
assigned him the role. Our students and graduates have acquired a reputation for hard work; human interest stories on that theme are common. It seems then that this legacy should produce a Student Bar Association comparable to any othe1· school's counterpart. Our faculty is
behind the SBA, and our alumni - who have never had the opportunity
for such an integrated student group - most probably hail its birth.
The only precinct yet to be heard from is the present study body. Let's
meet the challenge of S\lCCess !
If you enjoy tackling an issue of law and reporting on it, if you
want to enter moot court competition, if you have ideas on orienting first
year students, if you have any good thoughts which could find some expression through the machinery of SBA, please don't hesitate to speak
with the members of our Board of Governors, see your elected representatives and make your desires known. This pioneer edition is the result
of your classmates' efforts. They have volunteered their time and energies to launch a precedent in our law school co~munity. Your contributions will serve both our school and your legal training in general.
This writing is not a special plea for geniuses with naturally-endowed
abilities; the call is for active membership by all students who are willing
to dedicate a sincere endeavor. We all recog·nize the limitations of time
and studies; yet most of us can spare some time which could not be more
profitably spent than by helping SBA become a living symbol of the
progress of Suffolk Law School.

StuJenl Cfo:Je-upt,

{J-

DAY DIVISION

EVENING DIVISION

Within the day law school may be found students of varied backgrounds and ambitions. Among them are:
Murray Duncan Ji arris, Colonel, U. S. A. Ret., was born at Marquette, Michigan fifty-six years ago. He received an Engineer of Mines
degree from Leheigh University in 1926, and did postgraduate studies in business administration. l\!lurray
also attende,d several military schools during his thirty
years of active army service. He is distinguished
by many awards which include the Legion of Merit,
the Bronze Star and the Medaille de la Reconnaissance. He has served as chairman and professor at
Northeastern University in the Department of Military Science and Tactics. His present objective? Harris
"To live long enough to build and enjoy a second
career."
Terrance F. Perkins was born forty-two years ago in Ipswich,
Massachusetts where he resides today with his wife and children. As
part of his early naval career, Ted has studied at the University of South
Carolina and the School of Na val Science at Newport,
Rhode Island. He served in the South Pacific and in
1958, after twenty-one years of active service, retired
from the navy as a lieutenant commander. Dedicated
to civic activities, Ted has been elected School Committeeman of Ipswich; his only compensation for many
hours of working out school problems is the satisfaction
of knowing that children will derive maximum educational benefits for minimum cost. Ted's objective in
studying law? - "To enter a profession dedicated to
Per kins
the service of my community."
Paul Lawrence lVong ,ms born in China thirtyeight years ago; has studied, for four years, at the
National Peking University Law School in China; and
plans to specialize in tort law in the United States. The
well-knm,r n trial lawyer, Melvin Belli, has shown some
interest in engaging Paul when he has completed his
studies of American law. Paul's previous legal studies
,vere geared to code law in China's no jury, judicial
system.

Evening law students are a heterogeneous group, they include public officials, civil servants, accountants, insurance adjusters, engineers,
druggists, bankers, salesmen, teachers, and others. All have different
reasons for studying the law, for is it not true that the future attorney
will be engaged in various types of work.
The "typical" evening law student is in his middle to late twenties,
married with two children, a college graduate, and a white collar worker.
Although differing in background and employment, the students have a
great deal in common. All have an insatiable thirst for knowledge of the
law. All hope to become successful, practicing attorneys. All realize that
requires time, study and sacrifices.
"Perseverance" is the keynote of evening law students, who, for
four years, attends classes three nights a week, three hours a night;
studies on Saturdays; and must maintain full time employment. Sundays
are usually spent "reacquainting" themselves ,vith their families after six
days of work, classes and study, but time being so precious even these
hours are budgeted.
Predicated upon their mutual interests, students, among themselves
and with faculty members, form associations which often develop into
close friendships. These friendships and their wives' understanding
bolsters their morale and encourages them to strive even harder to reach
their goal - graduation and, eventually practice.
Sketches of two evening students:

Wong

Bruce K. Carpenter was born twenty-seven years ago, has done
everything from feeding elephants and pounding stakes, while tra veiling
, '"".,,,. .
with a circus, to teaching Latin, Greek and philosophy.
He has served in the Marine Corps in Japan and as a
Massachusetts Correction Officer at Nor folk Prison.
A graduate of Brown University and a family man, he
has actively participated in the National Moot Court
Competition while at Suffolk Law. Bruce is truly an
unusual student; he has the manner of Clarence Darrow
and the stature of Daniel Webster. His recent admission to the Washington, D. C. Bar - before graduation - is but another of his unusual accomplishments.
Carpenter

Frederick TV. Kinsley. Bill, as he is called by his classmates, resides
in Marblehead with his wife and two children. ln 1930 he was graduated
from Marblehead High School, and in 1935 from the U.S. Naval Academy. Bill is still on active duty with the Navy as a
Commander attached to the Boston Group Atlantic
Reserve Fleet. During his naval career he has served
in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas in various capacities - from ensign gunnery officer of a cruiser ( Marblehead CL12) to commanding officer of his own ship,
the USS Alcon AK 259. Bill has the distinction of being
the only officer in the Navy today who was present at
Tsingtao, China in 1938 at the commencement of the
Kinsley
Japanese occupation and was present when the Japanese
occupation forces surrendered in 1945. Bill plans to practice law when he
retires from active duty.
Alexander I. Cella. AI, a bachelor from Medford, is serving his
second term as State Representative to the General
Court. In 194 7 he was graduated from Medford High
School, in 195 1 from Harvard College and in 19 53
received a master's degree in Public Administration
from Harvard. Except for his thesis, Al has completed
the requirements for a doctorate degree. From 19 53 to
1956 he was a Teaching Fellow at Harvard. Al plans
to practice law in his community. Al's interesting article
Cella
on capital punishment may be found on pages 4 and 5.

